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Abstract 
Gerbner and Gross’s cultivation theory predicts that prolonged exposure to TV violence creates fear of crime, 
symptomatic of a mean world syndrome. We tested the theory’s prediction in a time series model with annual changes 
in violence portrayal on popular US TV shows from 1972 to 2010 as a predictor of changes in public perceptions of local 
crime rates and fear of crime. We found that contrary to the prediction that TV violence would affect perceptions of 
crime rates, TV violence directly predicted fear of crime holding constant national crime rates and perceptions of crime 
rates. National crime rates predicted fear of crime but only as mediated by perceptions of local crime rates. The 
findings support an interpretation of cultivation theory that TV drama transports viewers into a fictive world that 
creates fear of crime but without changing perceptions of a mean world. 
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1. Introduction 
“Fearful people are more dependent, more easily 
manipulated and controlled, more susceptible to 
deceptively simple, strong, tough measures and 
hard-line postures—both political and religious. 
They may accept and even welcome repression if it 
promises to relieve their insecurities. That is the 
deeper problem of violence-laden television.”  
George Gerbner, Ph.D, testimony before a U.S. 
House of Representatives Sub Committee, October 
21, 1981 (Gerbner, 1981a, p. 7). 
Cultivaton theory, developed by Gerbner and Gross 
(1976) and colleagues (Gerbner, Gross, Morgan, Signor-
ielli, & Shanahan, 2002), is among the three most cited 
theories in communication research (Bryant & Miron, 
2004). Gerbner et al. argued that television (TV), as the 
dominant cultural medium, cultivated a social reality 
that was often at odds with objective reality. They 
were particularly interested in the effects of violent TV 
content, which they predicted would create fear of 
others in audiences. Indeed, “[F]ear—that historic 
instrument of social control—may be an even more 
critical residue of a show of violence than aggression” 
(Gerbner & Gross, 1976, p. 178). Gerbner et al. 
supported this contention with their pioneering 
Cultural Indicators Project’s (CIP), which content 
analyzed TV programming and found extensive violent 
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content (Morgan, Shanahan, & Signorielli, 2008). They 
proposed that long-term heavy exposure to such TV 
content would gradually cultivate unrealistic fear and 
heightened mistrust of others.  
Analysis of national surveys revealed that heavy TV 
viewers overestimated the prevalence of violence and 
the presence of police (Gerbner, Gross, Signorielli, 
Morgan, & Jackson‐Beeck, 1979). When heavy viewers 
were asked whether they would be ‘afraid to walk 
alone at night in their neighborhood,’ they were more 
likely to answer yes than light viewers. Gerbner and 
colleagues named this phenomenon the ‘mean world 
syndrome,’ which consisted of viewing the world as a 
dangerous and violent place, where people ‘just looked 
out for themselves,’ and ‘could not be trusted’ (Gerb‐
ner, Gross, Morgan, Signorielli, 1980). 
Despite its influence on media research, cultivation 
theory met with considerable criticism. For example, 
Doob and Macdonald (1979) challenged it with the 
finding that heavy TV viewing by survey respondents 
no longer predicted fear of their environment after 
controlling for the amount of crime in their Toronto, 
Canada neighborhoods. Further criticism of cultivation 
theory came from Hughes (1980) and Hirsch (1980, 
1981), who reanalyzed the surveys analyzed by Gerbner 
and colleagues and found that cultivation effects were 
no longer present after demographic controls were 
added. They argued instead that evidence of cultivation 
could be explained by patterns of TV viewing by various 
demographic groups (e.g., those of low income or low 
education) that were also more likely to mistrust others. 
Gerbner and colleagues responded to these 
criticisms (Gerbner, 1981b; Gerbner, Gross, Morgan, & 
Signorielli, 1981) by emphasizing the concepts of 
resonance and mainstreaming to correct for the effects 
of potential demographic differences (Gerbner, Gross, 
Morgan, & Signorielli, 1980). However, the field continued 
to identify limitations in the cultivation approach. 
Whereas the theory initially proposed that cultivation 
effects were attributable to the entire body of TV 
content, subsequent research suggested that it might 
only apply to specific types of programming. For example, 
in a survey of Florida adults, Chiricos, Eschholz, and 
Gertz (1997) found that watching TV news and listening 
to radio news predicted fear of crime. Romer, Jamieson 
and Aday (2003) found that fear of crime was 
cultivated by local and national TV news reporting 
rather than overall TV viewing. In addition, Dowler 
(2003) analyzed a 1995 national sample of adults and 
found a weak relation between watching crime shows 
and fear of crime but no prediction for the amount of TV 
hours watched per week. Thus, it became clearer that the 
type of programming watched could be an important 
factor predicting cultivation effects (Romer et al, 2014). 
Despite the critiques, a 1997 meta-analysis by Morgan 
(1996) of a comprehensive published bibliography of 
cultivation studies since 1976 found a small but significant 
overall cultivation effect, r = 0.091. Nevertheless, 
nearly all of the research included in the analysis was 
cross-sectional. Therefore it remains an open question 
whether the effects of TV viewing on fear of crime are 
attributable to TV content or are the result of 
confounds from subsets of the population more 
inclined to watch shows that feature crime (e.g., police 
dramas or local news) and more likely to be fearful 
apart from TV exposure. 
Previous research has also not tested a striking feature 
of cultivation theory, that heavy viewing of fictional TV 
programming can change perceptions of the world, so 
that those perceptions become more consistent with 
fictional TV than with the reality that viewers confront on 
a daily basis in their lives. It is not difficult to imagine that 
news programming might influence viewers’ perceptions 
of crime rates (Lowry, Nio, & Leitner, 2003; Romer, Ja-
mieson, & Aday, 2003) but such a prediction regarding 
fictional TV is more controversial.  
The present research was designed to help evaluate 
the theory’s prediction regarding fictional TV pro‐
gramming. Rather than studying a cross-section of the 
population, our study examined changes over time in 
national exposure to violent TV content sampled from 
the Coding of Health and Media Project (CHAMP, see 
www.YouthMediaRisk.org). This project conducted a 
content analysis of TV programming from 1950 to the 
present that focused on one type of programming that 
should produce cultivation effects on fear of crime, 
namely popular prime-time dramas featuring stories 
with police, legal, medical, and western themes. By 
examining annual deviations from trend in violent TV 
content, this time series analysis (Diebold, 2007) can 
evaluate the relationship between the public’s 
perceptions of crime prevalence and its fears of crime 
as reported in Gallup’s national opinion surveys. This 
eliminates the problem of confounds due to demographic 
and viewing pattern differences because these 
characteristics would not be expected to change from 
year to year. In addition, annual changes in violent TV 
content can be distinguished from changes in police 
reports of violent crime, thereby providing a relatively 
clean prediction of the effects of TV fictional content 
on the public’s reported fear.  
We also tested a model that could determine 
whether the relationship between fictional TV violence 
and fear of crime was mediated by changes in perceptions 
of real-world crime prevalence, as cultivation theory 
would predict. According to cultivation theory, fictional 
TV creates an impression of a mean world that should 
mediate the experience of fear. However, an alternative 
explanation suggests that violent programs, by 
dramatizing the effects of violence, can influence fear 
without affecting perceptions of real-world crime.  
Suspending disbelief in dramas is a powerful 
mechanism that allows viewers to identify with the 
characters and experience their emotions vicariously, 
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in a sense “transporting” them into the world of the 
drama (Green & Dill, 2013). For example, in an early 
study of the effects of transportation in TV ads, 
Deighton, Romer and McQueen (1989) found that TV 
ads classified as dramas, rather than persuasive 
arguments, were processed emotionally more than 
cognitively and persuaded consumers by engaging 
them empathically. Dramas were just as successful in 
persuading consumers as factual appeals, but the 
mechanism was different, relying instead on the 
audience’s ability to place (i.e., “transport”) itself into 
the actors’ world and experience the actor’s use of the 
product. Similarly, this process could explain an 
emotional fear reaction in an audience viewing violent 
TV dramas. In other words, drama can transport the 
audience without necessarily affecting perceptions of 
the prevalance of crime in their daily environment.  
Repeated TV show exposure can also encourage par-
asocial relations between the audience and the show’s 
characters (Schiappa, Allen, & Gregg, 2007), an effect 
that can heighten the empathic experience elicited by 
identification with TV characters. Green & Brock built 
transportation theory on these mechanisms, which can 
explain audiences’ affect-based involvement with fic-
tional characters (Green & Dill, 2013). Oatley (1999) also 
argued that identification and sympathy with the pro-
tagonists goals or the re-experience of emotions trig-
gered by the drama could enhance the impact of fiction-
al depictions. Thus, we proposed that transportation 
mechanisms may explain changes over time in the culti-
vation of fear of crime predicted by violence in fictional 
TV dramas and could do so apart from changes in per-
ceptions of real world crime prevalence. 
2. Research Questions 
Given our ability to evaluate changes in violent TV 
content over time, we posed two research questions:  
RQ1: Do changes in this programming from year to 
year correlate with corresponding changes in 
national levels of fear of crime apart from official 
national crime rates? and 
RQ2: if the violence rate in TV programming 
correlates with fear, is this relation mediated by 
changes in perceptions of real world crime rates or 
by other processes, such as by transporting 
audiences into experiencing fear apart from levels 
of violence reflected in those rates?  
3. Method 
3.1. TV Sample Selection 
For the purposes of this study, we used the Coding of 
Health and Media Project (CHAMP) content analysis of 
the top 30 prime-time drama network television epi-
sodes from 1972 to 2010 that were available for pur-
chase as identified by Brooks and Marsh (Brooks & 
Marsh, 2009) and Nielsen’s website http://www. 
nielsen.com/us/en.html. We began the study series in 
1972 because it was the year when national survey da-
ta regarding crime issues became more regular on an 
annual basis. Sampled TV shows across the decades in-
cluded crime, detective, and medical genres, such as 
Kojak and Hawaii Five-O from the 1970’s, Hill Street 
Blues and Trapper John M.D. from the 1980’s, Law and 
Order and ER from the 1990’s, and CSI: Crime Scene In-
vestigation and House M.D. from 2000–2010. The 
shows we sampled remained popular over time, mak-
ing it likely that we could capture the same audiences 
from year to year. For a list of sampled TV shows by 
year, see www.YouthMediaRisk.org. Because TV sea-
sons cover two calendar years, the study examined TV 
episodes that ran in the spring and fall of the same 
year so that they could be compared with annual 
measures of fear of crime, perceptions of violent crime 
prevalence, and FBI reports of crime.  
When available, every other episode was coded per 
season, or if fewer than six episodes were available for 
purchase, all available episodes were coded. We coded 
fall and spring seasons separately to enable a match 
between TV content changes and the most closely cor-
responding Gallup survey from the spring or fall of the 
25 available years of the fear of crime data. The sample 
totaled 475.4 hours of commercial-free programming 
from 1972 to 2010 with a mean of 19.0 hours per year 
(standard deviation = 11.2). The study did not seek I.R.B. 
approval because it did not involve human subjects. 
The dramas in our sample reflected a popular part of 
the prime-time TV landscape based on examination of 
Nielsen household viewership shares, which estimate 
the percentage of TV households tuned to a program 
(Local Media Market Solutions, 2012). Because house-
hold TV penetration is available for every fifth year (Lo-
cal Media Market Solutions, 2012), we calculated shares 
for those years from 1975–2005 as follows: (sum of Niel-
sen shares for TV shows in year) × (% of households with 
TV in the same year). These scores, estimated every 10 
years, show the total household shares annually ex-
posed to the sampled shows. The show values were 43.0 
in 1975, 63.5 in 1985, 58.4 in 1995, and 106.0 in 2005. 
Shares increased since 1975 because in later years more 
shows were available for coding and the proportion of 
households with TV increased. These share totals indi-
cate that sizeable proportions of households were ex-
posed each week to the TV shows during the fall and 
spring seasons (excluding reruns). 
3.2. Coding of TV Violence Sequences 
Twenty undergraduate students were trained to mas-
ter a codebook of rules for the identification of violent 
and other content (see http://youthmediarisk.org for 
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the codebook). Training was based on about 21 hours 
of TV content. Coders were required to exhibit a high 
level of reliability using Krippendorff’s alpha formula 
(Krippendorff, 2012) (Kα > 0.80), which controls for 
chance agreement across coders. The typical coding 
unit was either a 4- or 4.5-minute segment based on di-
viding half-hour episodes without commercials (20 mins) 
into 5 equal segments and dividing hour long episodes 
with no commercials (45 mins) into 10 segments. Hence, 
the coding unit was made as close as possible to the 4-
minute length of half-hour episodes, which were the 
dominant episode length. Because this could produce 
more violent segments for shorter episodes, we con-
verted violence rates to a time-based based metric (i.e., 
instances per commercial free episode hour). 
The definition of violence was adapted from 
previous research (Yokota & Thompson, 2000) as fol-
lows, “Physical acts where the aggressor makes or at‐
tempts to make some physical contact with the inten-
tion of causing injury or death” and “intentional acts 
where the aggressor makes or attempts to make some 
physical contact that has potential to inflict injury or 
harm.” We excluded natural disasters; accidents, ob‐
jects not attributed to a character, and expected physi-
cal acts in sport games that are not intended to seri-
ously injure (tackling, checking, boxing, stunts). The 
violence measure did not differentiate violence that 
may produce more or less fear such as between 
stranger versus family violence or violence committed 
in self defense. We assumed these features would not 
change dramatically from year to year and thus would 
not explain any relations we found with fear of crime.  
Violent acts were counted as “sequences of vio‐
lence” (Bushman, Jamieson, Weitz, & Romer, 2013). A 
sequence of violence was defined as an uninterrupted 
display of a character or a group of characters engaged 
in acts of violence. Violence was coded as uninterrupt-
ed if the character used one weapon or method con-
tinuously, regardless of the number of victims. Vio-
lence counts of 25 or more sequences per 5 minute 
segment were recoded to a value of 25. The sum of 
violent sequences per coding segment was the meas-
ure of violence in a segment. Reliability for identifying 
TV violent sequences was high (Kα = 0.87).  
We coded fall and spring episodes separately so 
that we could match TV violence rates more closely to 
the time of year when the Gallup survey was taken. In 
some of the years (24%), Gallup surveyed fear closer to 
the spring TV schedule. For each time period, we 
calculated the mean of the log transformed violence 
rates across episodes and converted the scores back 
into the actual rate per episode hour. The fall and 
spring violence rates were highly correlated (r = 0.61).  
3.3. Assessment of Fear and Prevalence of Crime 
Survey data collected by the Gallup Poll from 1972 to 
2010 were used to assess national rates of the US pub-
lic’s fear of crime and perceptions of crime prevalence. 
The Gallup Poll is a demographically weighted random-
digit-dialed national telephone survey that asks the fol-
lowing question of respondents ages 18+: “Is there any‐
where near where you live that is, within a mile, where 
you would be afraid to walk alone at night?” (Gallup, 
2010a). The annual percent of yes responses was used 
to measure fear of crime. There were years in which 
the question was not asked, leaving us with 25 time 
points between 1972 and 2010.  
The Gallup survey was used rather than results for 
the same question in the National Opinion Reseach 
Council’s General Social Survey (GSS) because Gallup 
covered a longer time period and was a nationally rep-
resentative telephone sample rather than the GSS, 
which uses in-person home-based interviews that may 
have introduced a sample bias by only including re-
spondents who were not fearful of strangers (i.e., be-
ing interviewed in their homes).  
The perception of crime prevalence was assessed 
using the same Gallup national telephone survey ques-
tion for ages 18+: “Is there more crime in your area 
than there was a year ago, or less?” (Gallup, 2010b). 
The percent that responded ‘more’ was used as the 
measure of perceived prevalence. There were years in 
which the question was not asked, leaving us with 22 
time points between 1972 and 2010 for this item. 
3.4. National Violent Crime Rate  
The annual national violent crime rate was taken from 
the FBI uniform crime reports (Bureau of Justice 
Staistics, 2013), which had data for every year since 
1972. It measures the rate per 100,000 persons of 
violent crimes reported to the police in the U.S. This 
index includes murder, non-negligent manslaughter, 
forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. 
3.5. Data Analysis 
Curve fitting for identifying best fitting trends was 
conducted using SPSS 20.0. The study variables were 
detrended by identifying the best fitting polynomial 
function for non-missing cases as measured by 
adjusted R2. Residuals from the best fitting polynomial 
function served as the measure of annual deviations 
from trend (Diebold, 2007). These residuals were also 
evaluated graphically to confim stationarity (i.e., that 
the overall level and deviations from the mean of the 
series did not change over time after removing the 
underlying time trend), an important prerequisite for 
analyzing relations between time series (Diebold, 2007). 
The program MPlus version 7.1 (Muthén & Muthén, 
2013) was used to fit a structural equation model 
(SEM) to test the model in Figure 1, including tests of 
mediation (MacKinnon, 2008). Robust standard errors 
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were applied to protect against violations of normality, 
correlated errors, and heteroscedasticity. The program 
only included non-missing cases (N = 25) for reported 
fear, the dependent variable. Missing data for percep-
tion of crime (16%) were handled using full information 
maximum likelihood (FIML) procedures. Model fit was 
good after dropping the nonsignificant path from TV vio-
lence rate to perception of crime using multiple indices 
of global fit and residual diagnostics. The indices includ-
ed a low χ2(1) = 0.029, p = 0.866 and root-mean-square-
error-of-approximation (RMSEA) value = 0.000; high val-
ues of the comparative fit index (CFI) = 1.00 and the 
Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) = 1.14. All tests were two tailed, 
and 95% confidence intervals (CI) are reported. 
 
 
Figure 1. Standardized solution for the structural equation model of predictors of fear of 
crime (all variables detrended). Dashed paths are nonsignificant. 
 
Figure 2. TV violence rate (left) and percentage of population reporting fear of crime (right) 
with best fitting trends and upper (UCI) and lower (LCI) 95% confidence intervals, 1972-
2010. 
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4. Results 
As seen in Figure 2, TV violence exhibited a quadratic 
trend over the study period (adj. R2 = 0.60, p ≤ 0.001) 
dropping rapidly from 1972 to the mid 1990s before 
rising again to 2010. This violence count per episode 
hour declined from 6.5 in 1972 to a minimum of 1.4 in 
1996 and rose again to 3.7 in 2010 (mean = 3.4). Fear 
of crime followed a cubic trend (adj. R2 = 0.75, p ≤ 
0.001) that also declined from a high point in the 
1980’s to rise again in the 2000’s. The variable ranged 
from 42% in 1972 to 30% in 2001 and rose again to 
37% in 2010 (mean = 39.4%). As seen in Table 1, these 
two raw rates were correlated (r = 0.469). It is note-
worthy that the FBI national crime rate was inversely 
related to the TV violence rate (r = -0.483) but positive-
ly related to fear (r = 0.388). The violent crime rate 
ranged from a maximum of 758.2 in 1991 to a mini-
mum of 404.5 in 2010 (mean = 553.4). However, the 
FBI crime rate was unrelated to perceptions of crime 
(r= 0.174), which declined from 51% in 1972 to 26% in 
2001 and rose again to 49% in 2010 (mean = 44.4%). 
Nevertheless, perceptions of crime and reported fear 
of crime were strongly correlated (r= 0.544). 
The detrended time series for TV violence and fear 
are shown in Figure 3. Detrended series for national 
crime rates, perceptions of crime prevalence, and fear 
of crime are in Figure 4. As seen in Table 1, Detrended 
TV violence and fear of crime were not significantly 
correlated at the bivariate level (r = 0.222). However, 
the detrended violent crime rate was associated with 
detrended fear of crime (r = 0.373) and especially with 
perceptions of crime prevalence (r = 0.705) As with the 
raw trends, detrended perceptions of crime prevalence 
were associated with fear of crime (r = 0.640).  
The SEM results in Table 2 show that TV violence 
was correlated with fear after controlling for national 
crime rates. However, this relationship was direct with 
no mediation by crime prevalence perceptions (see 
also Figure 1). In addition, national crime rates were 
related to fear but the relationship was mediated by 
perceptions of crime prevalence. The total effect of 
national crime rates on fear as mediated by perceptions 
of crime prevalence was significant. Total hours of cod-
ed TV programming per year (i.e., the closest matching 
fall or spring TV episodes per year matched in time 
with the closest half year when Gallup surveyed fear) 
did not change the pattern of results when added to 
the SEM analysis. Using the full year of TV violence 
with both the spring and fall seasons rather than the 
season closest to when the Gallup fear survey question 
was taken produced a similar but somewhat less relia-
ble result (p < 0.05). 
Table 1. Pearson correlations (N) for detrended (bottom) and raw (top) study variables, 1972–2010. 
  Fear of Crime TV violence rate Perception of crime FBI crime rate 
Fear of Crime (25) 0.469** (25) 0.544** (21) 0.388* (25) 
TV violence  0.222 (25) (25) 0.183 (21) -0.483** (25) 
Perception of crime 0.640*** (21) -0.186 (21) (22) 0.174 (22) 
FBI Crime rate 0.373* (25) -0.323 (25) 0.705*** (22) (39) 
Note: *p ≤ 0.10, **p ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01 
 
Figure 3. Detrended standardized scores for TV violence rate per hour and fear of 
crime, 1972–2010. 
 Media and Communication, 2014, Volume 2, Issue 2, Pages 31-41 37 
 
Figure 4. Detrended standardized scores for the national violent crime rate, 
perceptions of crime, and fear of crime, 1972–2010. 
Table 2. Model parameters and tests for detrended predictors of fear of crime with tests for mediation, 1972–2010. 
Independent variables b 95% CI P value 
 Fear of Crime 
TV violence 0.968 0.510, 1.43 0.000 
Perceived crime rate 0.229 0.089, 0.368 0.001 
National (FBI) crime rate 0.002 -.020, 0.024 0.858 
 Perception of Crime 
National (FBI) crime rate 0.116 0.068, 0.165 0.000 
 Mediation 
Total effect of FBI crime rate on Fear of crime 0.029 0.010, 0.047 0.002 
FBI crime rate  Perceived crime  Fear of crime 0.027 0.004, 0.049 0.020 
 
5. Discussion 
We tested predictions informed by cultivation theory 
that annual changes in violent content of popular U.S. 
TV dramas would predict the American public’s percep‐
tion of local crime rates and its fear of crime and that 
these relations would occur independently of national 
violent crime rates. We tested these predictions using 
a structural equation model in which perceptions of 
crime rates mediated effects of both TV violence and 
national crime rates on fear of crime. We found that 
although national crime rates predicted perceptions of 
local crime rates, TV violence did not. Rather, the re-
sults suggest that TV violence was directly related to 
fear of crime with no significant mediation by percep-
tions of local crime rates. National crime rates also 
predicted fear but only as mediated by perceptions of 
local crime rates.  
Our findings supported an important prediction of 
cultivation theory that the rate of TV drama violence 
predicts reported fear of crime. However, TV drama vi-
olence did not predict audience perceptions of crime 
prevalence. Instead, national crime rates compiled by 
the FBI were related to perceptions of local crime 
rates, and these perceptions mediated the relation be-
tween crime rates and fear. Thus, the results suggest 
that the public’s perceptions of changes in local crime 
rates may be sensitive to changes in police reports of 
crime but not to changes in the amount of violence 
shown in TV dramas.  
The study results are consistent with the prediction 
from transportation theories that TV drama violence 
can influence fear but not necessarily by changing the 
audience’s beliefs about the prevalence of crime in 
their local environments. Therefore, we interpret the 
results as supporting the hypothesis derived from 
transportation theories (Green & Brock, 2000) that TV 
audiences may be transported into a fictive world in 
which the effects of portrayed violence are experi-
enced emotionally by the audience but do not lead to 
changes in the perceived prevalence of crime. Indeed, 
theories of drama suggest that it is often the willing 
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suspension of disbelief that enables audiences to em-
pathize with characters and thereby to experience 
their emotions (Green & Brock, 2000). And although 
this experience can be quite powerful, these results 
suggest it does not necessarily require changes in per-
ceptions of the prevalence of the dramatized experi-
ence in the real world.  
There is evidence that non-fiction media exposure, 
such as in TV and radio news (Chiricos, Eschholz, & 
Gertz, 1997) and police reality shows (Holbert, Shah, & 
Kwak, 2004), perhaps because they are perceived as 
real, generate fear in the public. For example, Lowry, 
Nio, and Leitner (2003) used agenda setting as the the-
oretical explanation for the finding that national net-
work news predicted crime as the nation’s ‘most im‐
portant problem.’ Consistent with cultivation theory, 
Romer, Jamieson, and Aday (2003) found that local TV 
news in cities with high coverage of crime predicted 
fear of crime and crime perceptions. Holbert, Shah, and 
Kwak (2004) analyzed a two-year national probability 
sample and reported that while viewing crime dramas 
did not predict fear of crime, exposure to television 
news and police reality programs did. They attributed 
this difference to police reality programs being per-
ceived as more real. We find it noteworthy that both 
TV violence and fear of crime have changed in tandem 
over time in recent years even though the actual vio-
lent crime rate has declined over this period (not 
shown) (Gallup, 2010a). Therefore, this pattern sug-
gests that TV dramatic portrayals have increased fears 
of crime despite the decline in the actual violent crime 
rate. We do not have measures of TV news progam-
ming that could tell us whether the reporting of crime 
has declined over this period. However, it is likely that 
TV news trends have captured at least some of the na-
tional violent crime rate trend. In addition, by holding 
constant perceived prevalence of crime, we have con-
trolled some of the potential influence of TV news, 
which would be expected to affect this perception. 
Consistent with Gerbner’s cultivation theory predic‐
tion that TV programming promotes fear and political 
positions that favor control of crime, Rosenberger and 
Callanan (2011) found that hours of TV watched pre-
dicted more severe attitudes toward the treatment of 
criminals. At the same time, it is possible that viewers 
of fictional TV dramas are also more likely to be ex-
posed to TV news or other TV content that carries fear 
arousing messages disseminated by political actors. In-
deed, Beckett (1999) found that politicians often play 
on fear of crime as a way to gain support for punitive 
policies. Although we could not control for these ef-
fects, it is unlikely that these news effects would be 
correlated with annual changes in fictional program-
ming. Furthermore, our controls for changes in percep-
tions of crime suggest that news or other sources are 
channeled through that path rather than through 
changes in fictional TV programming. 
Because we use a time series approach that allows 
us to control for demographics but at the same time 
observe large changes in levels of violent program-
ming, our findings eliminate a common problem with 
cultivation studies, that they rely on cross-sectional re-
lations between TV exposure and audience outcomes. 
In our time series analysis, annual changes in TV con-
tent over time were unlikely to be related to fear of 
crime due to demographic shifts. Thus, the associations 
we observed between changes in TV content and pub-
lic fears of crime are more likely attributable to TV vio-
lent content than to demographic shifts or changes in 
viewing habits in the population. We cannot rule out 
the potential influence of third variables, but the study 
model controlled for national crime rates that were al-
so linked with fear as mediated by perceptions of local 
crime prevalence. Furthermore, the study provides a 
stronger test than many cross-sectional studies that 
have controlled demographic differences. If fear of 
crime is more strongly elicited by TV dramas in certain 
demographic groups, then holding those differences 
constant may also remove the effects of violent TV 
programming on those groups. The present study held 
demographic differences constant while violent pro-
gramming varied. As a result, cultivation effects may 
have been more observable.  
Our national time series findings may help to re-
solve some of the debate surrounding cultivation theo-
ry started by Doob and Macdonald (1979); Hughes 
(1980); and Hirsch (1980, 1981). We have been unable 
to find either a published long term time series analysis 
of fear of crime predicted by TV violence or a media-
tion model of national violent crime rate and the per-
ception of crime prevalence. Thus, this study employs a 
novel method to test predictions from cultivation theo-
ry and finds support for one of its basic proposals. It al-
so suggests a mechanism that can explain its effects 
without relying on the creation of a mean world.  
5.1. Strengths and Limitations 
The study’s strengths reside on its use of a large con-
tent analysis of popular TV programming with 475 
hours of commercial free TV episodes since the early 
1970’s. The surveys conducted by Gallup represent in‐
terviews with over 27,000 persons. Our ability to align 
TV programming with nationally representative survey 
data enabled us to evaluate changes in national expo-
sure to violent TV content after controlling for national 
violent crime rates (Gallup, 2010a). Thus, despite only 
being able to study 25 years of Gallup surveys, the da-
tabase represents a considerable body of survey and 
programming information. 
This study has limitations as well. It did not sample 
TV shows less popular than the Nielsen ranked top 30, 
non-dramatic genres, cable TV, or YouTube. The sample 
was also limited to shows that were available for pur-
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chase. Nevertheless, because these shows were availa-
ble years or decades later, they were likely very popular 
programs when they originally aired. In addition, be-
cause many of the shows remained popular over time, 
the same audiences likely saw them year after year.  
TV violence in this analysis was based on the aver-
age annual rate of TV violent sequence counts per epi-
sode hour and did not differentiate between violence 
that was initiated or received, or was in self-defense or 
not justified. It also did not control for trends in na-
tional and local news reporting of crime that may have 
influenced reports of fear.  
Our analysis assumed that annual changes in TV 
violence were not affected by public fear of crime, 
since it seemed unlikely that changes in population 
fear influenced contemporaneous changes in the 
amount of violent TV programming. Nevertheless, our 
analysis is still dependent on contemporaneous corre-
lations that are not as conclusive for drawing causal 
conclusions as lagged effects that provide evidence of 
temporal precedence. Indeed, only carefully controlled 
experiments with long-term exposure to variation in 
violent TV content could clearly test the causal relation 
between exposure to violent TV drama and fear of 
crime. It is also necessary to note that the ecological 
fallacy warns against generalizing from group to indi-
vidual behavior. There could be segments of the popu-
lation that were not affected by violent TV program-
ming or that responded in other ways. For example, a 
large gap has been found using the survey item regard-
ing fear, with U.S. women much more fearful than men 
(Toch & Maguire, 2014). Finally, we were limited to us-
ing the longest available measure of fear that was 
available for the four decades of the study. Future re-
search should address how audiences respond to fic-
tive TV violence using multiple measures of fear evalu-
ated among different audiences across age, gender, 
education, racial-ethnic identity, and socioeconomic 
status, while controlling for their reported media con-
sumption and political attitudes and behaviors.  
6. Conclusion 
The study result that annual change in TV violence, af-
ter controlling for the violent crime rate and percep-
tions of crime prevalence, was significantly related to 
change in national fear of crime from 1972 to 2010 is 
consistent with Gerbner’s explanation of the central 
tenet of cultivation theory. Indeed, he argued that the 
most important problem resulting from frequent expo-
sure to TV violence is not the direct imitation of vio-
lence by viewers, but the gradual increase in fear and 
mistrust that promotes authoritarian governance. A 
challenge for communication scholarship is to better 
understand cultivation processes in the 21st century’s 
rapidly changing technology-driven multiple media en-
vironments. 
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